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 The genesis of the idea for this paper occurred when David Marsh attended a session on 
historical institutionalism at the American Political Science Association Conference three 
year ago.  Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, two leading historical institutionalists, gave a 
paper, which was subsequently revised and published (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002), 
indeed this revised version is discussed at some length below.  The conference paper 
seemed to Dave to be very poor; indeed in his intervention Dave afforded it only one 
cheer.  Of course, the reception of the paper was sycophantic; a reception which is typical 
at these large US conference where audience for most sessions include a large number of 
friends and colleagues of the presenters.  In the bar afterwards Dave talked to a number 
of UK academics who were at the session and all agreed that the paper was weak; in 
contrast, the US academics he spoke to about the paper were much more positive.  This 
mixed response provoked an immediate question, actually two questions: Why?  We need 
to deconstruct that question and repose it as having two elements: In what way was the 
paper poor? For what reason was it poor?  In our view, answering those questions tells us 
much about historical institutionalism and American political science.  Here, we shall 
address the first of these issues, although the second will also be considered in a later 
revision of this piece, but we need to begin by outlining Pierson and Skocpol’s argument. 
 
Pierson and Skocpol on Historical Institutionalism 
The final version of Pierson and Skocpol’s paper is considerably better than that 
presented at the APSA conference.  It would be interesting, but perhaps a little unfair to 
trace those differences.  Here however, we shall deal with the final article, which, while 
improved, exhibits many of the problems in the original piece.  
 
Pierson and Skocpol argue that historical institutionalism sets itself up as an approach 
that overcomes the deficiencies of behaviouralist and rational choice approaches to social 
science analysis.  In their view (2002, 5), there are three central tenets to historical 
institutionalism that enable it to claim superiority over the alternative rational choice and 
behaviouralist accounts: 
 
a) a focus on outcomes and puzzles ; 
b) a focus on macro contexts within which meso-level and macro-level social and 
political processes occur; 
c) these processes are traced over time – history matters.  
 
a) Outcomes and Puzzles 
The view here seems to be that other accounts make more assumptions about outcomes, 
processes and methods. So, they argue, rational choice accounts are driven by research 
agendas derived from problems generated by overarching theories (2002, 5).  The focus 
is upon strategic action at the micro level.  Subsequently, this leads rational choice 
analysts to focus upon strategic actors operating within political contexts, choices are 
assumed to be identifiable and pay-offs transparent (2002, 5).  Yet, this approach is 
unable to account for later emerging preferences, or new actors (2002, 6).  All in all, this 
is a fairly standard critique of rational choice theory (for a better one see Ward, 2002).  In 
contrast, behaviouralism is criticised for its emphasis upon quantitative methodology that 
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can lead to the neglect of significant and substantive issues within the research agenda 
(2002, 5) 
 
Pierson and Skocpol argue that historical institutionalism claims to overcome the 
deficiencies of both approaches; it offers a ‘real-world’ approach. In consequence, 
historical institutionalists have produced studies which, while seeking to explain a 
particular social phenomenon, locate the issue or event in an historical context.  This 
leads the historical institutionalists to claim that: ‘(existing) historical and comparative-
historical studies [have] served to refute some arguments, refine others, discover new 
lines of causal argument and extend findings across eras and continents’ (2002, 4).  This, 
Pierson and Skocpol claim, enables a significantly more comprehensive analysis to be 
achieved. 
 
b) Macro Contexts. 
Pierson and Skocpol argue that historical institutionalism claims that both behaviouralists 
and rational choice theorists ignore the overarching context in which social and political 
processes occur which is a significant dimension of social analysis. 
 
They criticise behaviouralists, arguing that their emphasis on quantitative techniques 
leads to the assumption that the independent variables under analysis are causally linked 
to the behaviour (that is the dependent variable) they are utilised to explain (2002, 6).  
This means that the methods used inevitably fit with the outcomes; basic assumptions 
about behaviour lead to a particular method of analysis that fits those presumptions.  In 
contrast, historical institutionalism stresses the importance of the broader social context 
and argues that alternative causal paths may lead to similar outcomes (2002, 7).  While 
historical institutionalists claim to accept that any analysis should be consistent with 
plausible explanations of individual behaviour, they also acknowledge that there are 
patterns of resources and relationships that have both ‘channelling and delimiting’ effects 
on behaviour (2002, 7).  Historical institutionalists aim to identify these patterns and 
‘trace their causal impacts’ (2002, 7).  Rather than focussing on a single institution, 
historical institutionalism claims to focus on patterns of relationships and resources as 
broad sets of institutions interact to shape processes and outcomes (2002, 7).  It also 
emphasise the need for comparative analysis, because comparing cases allows more 
opportunity to theorise about why certain variables produce a given outcome in one 
setting, but do not necessarily combine in similar ways in another setting (2002, 8).  As 
such, changes in the broader context may result in differing outcomes.  This approach, 
historical institutionalists claim, represents a significant advance on both behavioural 
analyses, which tend to focus upon one point in time, or rational choice accounts, which 
focus on individual behaviour, or micro-level processes (2002, 8/9). 
 
c) Historical Processes – History Matters 
The historical institutionalists emphasise the need for temporal analysis (2002, 9), in 
order to avoid missing dimensions, which, in the short term may be insignificant, but in 
the long term may impact upon, and potentially be causally related to, the phenomenon 
under investigation.  They justify this methodologically in three ways: 
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i) Introducing a temporal dimension means more case are available and means 
that there is likely to be more variation in outcomes (2002, 10); 
ii) Tracing historical sequences can uncover causal relationships – including an 
historical dimension can make a real contribution to supporting or challenging 
claims of social causation (2002, 10); 
iii) There is an increased sensitivity to period effects, which may be missed in 
analyses based upon a short-time span (2002, 10). 
 
Pierson and Skocpol also argue that there are distinct temporal dimensions to social and 
political processes: 
 
i) The concept of path dependence is used to suggest that, once actors have gone 
so far down a particular course of action, it becomes difficult to reverse that 
course, so previously available potential alternatives become lost (2002, 10).  
The idea of path dependence can be used to explain institutional inertia and 
change and the way in which relationships of power become embedded in 
institutions.  Path dependence makes a contribution also by adding a temporal 
dimension to the analysis (2002, 11). 
ii) In addition, the approach points attention to the fact that the sequence of 
events is important to the overall outcome. 
iii) It also draws attention to lengthy, large-scale, slow moving social processes 
(p12), which, again, may be missed by analyses that focus upon a narrow time 
frame. 
iv) To theorise the development of processes over time also enables a ‘richer and 
more realistic’ account of ‘institutional and organizational change’ 2002, 13). 
 
Overall then, Pierson and Skocpol argue that historical institutionalists claim to offer a 
more comprehensive analysis of social stability and change.  An historical approach 
enables the introduction of a temporal element at both macro and meso levels of 
institutional analysis.  This means that elements, such as incremental change over 
significant periods of time, which may impact upon institutions, are acknowledged.  They 
claim that historical institutionalism overcomes the difficulties of both behavioural 
analyses, which focus on single points in time and which they equate with quantitative 
methods, and rational choice accounts which, again, they claim elevate the role of the 
individual without accounting for the institutions, or the macro-level context, in which 
the individuals make decisions. 
 
Beyond Pierson and Skocpol 
The rest of this draft engages with Pierson and Skocpol by offering a fuller discussion of 
the literature on historical institutionalism, leading to a different characterization of its 
core, which sees it as most appropriately located in a critical realist epistemological 
position – among other things, this also leads us to side with Hay and Wincott against 
Hall and Taylor.  In the next version of this paper, we shall continue to argue that the 
pluralism of Hall and Taylor, particularly, but also Pierson and Skocpol, reflects the 
failure of US political science fully to confront the rational choice paradigm that 
dominates their profession.  
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Whilst it is widely accepted that historical institutionalism is a facet of ‘new 
institutionalism’, its distinctiveness and coherence has been open to dispute. Here, we 
offer a brief overview of the new institutionalist literature to support two arguments: first, 
that the contested nature of new institutionalism underpins some of the controversy over 
the ‘historical’ variant; and, second, drawing on Jessop, the current interest in institutions 
has been developed at three different levels- thematic, methodological and ontological. 
We begin with a consideration of new institutionalism more broadly, before focusing on 
what we see as the key issues in relation to historical institutionalism.  
 
1) New Institutionalism?  
Two aspects of ‘New Institutionalism’ are widely agreed upon; firstly, it is argued that it 
reflected a response to the perceived excesses of both the ‘behaviouralist revolution’ and 
rational choice theory – this view is clear in Pierson and Skocpol’s discussion; secondly, 
proponents of such an approach would argue that institutions matter or, to put it another 
way, that the ‘organisation of political life makes a difference’ (March and Olsen, 
1984:747). Beyond these two, rather bland, observations, both the novelty and coherence 
of new institutionalism have been contested.  
 
This point is easily supported by a brief consideration of the different classificatory 
schema proposed to categorise sub-types of new institutionalism. To take just a few 
examples: Hall and Taylor identify four forms of new institutionalism (historical, 
sociological, rational choice and new institutionalism in economics1); by contrast, Peters 
develops a sevenfold typology (normative rational choice historical empirical 
sociological, institutions of interest representation and international institutionalism; 
Blyth focuses on two methodological traditions – historical and organisational; whilst 
Lowndes refers to international historical and empirical forms in order to interrogate the 
dichotomisation of rational choice and normative approaches. Whatismore, the problem 
of differential categorisations is exacerbated by the way theorists classify their own work. 
For example, whilst Sikkink sees her work as ‘interpretive institutionalism’ it is 
frequently viewed as historical institutionalist by others.   We aren’t interested here in 
adjudicating between these classificatory schema. Rather, we shall focus upon two key 
tensions within the literature, which affect any consideration of historical 
institutionalism: the specification of new institutionalism’s other; and the debate about 
levels of institutionalism.  
 
a) New Institutionalism’s Other 
The notion of ‘new’ institutionalism immediately invokes a comparison with ‘old’ 
institutionalism and it is important briefly to note that the nature and extent of the 
divergence between the two remains contested.  In crude terms, one can point to four 
interrelated differences between new and old institutionalism2. First, political institutions 
in new institutionalism are not reducible to political organisations, as they tended to be in 
old institutionalism, rather they are understood more broadly. Second, the concern with 
formal constitutions and organisations of old institutionalism has been supplemented with 
                                                 
1 Although this last category was not included in the final article. 
2 Although Rhodes (1995) rightly points out that new institutionalism’s characteristaion of old 
institutionalism is partial in both senses of the word. 
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an interest in more informal conventions. Third, an initial concern with the constraints 
that institutional design places on behaviour in institutions has been supplemented by a 
newer concern with the ways in which power is embodied in institutions. Fourth, there is 
a growing concern in new institutionalism with the interaction between individuals and 
institutions.  
 
These shifts have been accompanied by two changes in the methodological focus of 
institutional work. The previous focus on descriptive method and the associated ‘disdain 
for theory’ has given way to an increased use of quantitative analysis and an explicit 
concern with theory development. Crucially, these changes are usually viewed as a 
response to the behavioural revolution. As such, March and Olsen claim that it would: 
‘probably be more accurate to describe recent thinking [‘new institutionalism’] as 
blending elements of an old institutionalism into the non institutionalist styles of recent 
theories of politics’.  
 
On the basis of these characterizations of the difference between new and old 
institutionalism, it is widely accepted that different forms of new institutionalism result 
from different non-institutionalist theories of politics and this point will be developed 
below.  First though, two interrelated arguments need to be noted. Firstly, there is a 
tension between conceptualising new institutionalism as a response to ‘old 
institutionalism’ and conceptualising it as a corrective to ‘non-institutionalism’. The 
suggestion here is that, in either case, new institutionalism is mutually constructed with 
its specified other.  However, if one acknowledges that an understanding of 
institutionalism is, in part, affected by which other is specified, then we also have to 
accept that, from the outset, there will be diffuse readings of new institutionalism. This is 
particularly evident in March and Olsen’s claim that, whilst new institutionalism can be 
presented and discussed as an epistemological perspective of profound importance to 
social science, they are more concerned with it as a:  ‘narrow collection of challenges to 
contemporary theoretical thinking in political science’. As such, the relative absence of 
theorisation in the old institutionalism literature left a space in which a new 
institutionalism could be developed.  However, conceptualising new institutionalism as 
rational choice or behaviouralisms other meant that its concerns were circumscribed from 
the outset. 
 
b) Levels of Institutionalism3:   
While acknowledging the potential for considerable variation in both the reach and the 
grasp of new institutionalism, as Jessop argues, it is also important to differentiate 
between different levels of new institutionalist analysis. Jessop develops a threefold 
categorisation of institutional turns: thematic; methodological; and ontological The 
thematic turn emphasises the belief that institutions are important. The methodological 
turn focuses on the: ‘the intuition, hypothesis, or discovery that the institutional aspects 
of social life provide a fruitful – or even, indeed, the most productive – entry point for 
exploring and explaining the social world even if the ensuing research is extended later to 
include other themes or explanatory factors’. Finally, the ontological turn involves the 
                                                 
3 In positing different levels of institutionalism the space is opened up to look at the interplay between 
them.  Of course, the role of discourse and construction of narratives would be crucial in this respect. 
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intuition, hypothesis, or discovery that institutions constitute the essential foundations of 
social existence. Jessop utilises this distinction to develop two further arguments. First, 
he claims that not all those engaging in institutional analysis take the methodological or 
ontological understanding; many authors are content with the bland observation that 
institutions matter. Secondly, he suggests that to speak of a turn, rather than a paradigm 
shift, a particular line of institutional analysis must focus on continuity, rather than 
change; an argument developed in a different way by Peters, as we shall see below.  
 
Jessop’s account can be utilized in relation to our preceding argument about mutual 
construction. If new institutionalism is understood as a limited response to the excesses of 
behaviouralism, then it is best seen as a methodological institutionalism, circumscribed 
by the underpinning ontological commitments of the approach in which it is grounded. In 
contrast, if new institutionalism is constructed in opposition to old institutionalism, this 
conceptualisation is, arguably, more accommodating to an ontological understanding 
because space remains for the elucidation of, previously bypassed, ontological and 
epistemological premises.  
 
Nevertheless, two clarifications of Jessop’s argument should be made. First, as Hay and 
Wincott point out, and this issue is discussed at more length below, it is clear that the 
ontological and methodological are closely related in all varieties of new institutionalism, 
whether or not this is acknowledged. Secondly, institutions and institutionalisms can’t be 
viewed as exclusively ontological concepts.  Rather, they need to be located within a 
broader meta-theoretical framework; one informed by critical realism and seeing the 
relationship between structure and agency and the material and the ideational as 
dialectical. Indeed, this will be the core argument of this piece; that the future of 
historical institutionalism should lie in such an approach.  
 
2) The Core of Historical Institutionalism? 
We aim to substantiate that last claim by examining four key issues in the literature on 
historical institutionalism: the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the 
various varieties of institutionalism; the approach to the structure/ agency problem; the 
role of ideas, institutions and material relations; and the problem path dependency and 
whether historical institutionalism can explain change as well as stability. 
 
a) On Ontology and Epistemology 
Actually, we don’t need to dwell too long on this point, because much of our argument 
has already been made by Hay and Wincott.  Actually, we want to make three points 
here.  First, many of the critics of historical institutionalism base their critique on 
positivist understanding of political science which is at odds with the position that many, 
if not most, historical institutionalists adopt.  Second, and this is the core of Hay and 
Wincott’s argument against Hall and Taylor, different types of institutionalism are rooted 
in different epistemological positions and, as such, it is difficult, if not impossible simply 
to integrate work from the different schools of new institutionalism.  Third, and with 
think this argument follows from the last, historical institutionalism is likely to have most 
value if it is rooted in a realist, more specfically a critical realist, epistemology.  Each of 
these points deserves some attention. 
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i) Positivist Arrogance 
There is a problem in political science that there are some positivists who feel that there 
is only one way to do political science: their way (for a exposition of the two views here 
see Dowding 2001 and Marsh and Smith, 2002).  This position is evident in the literature 
on historical institutionalism in the work of Peters. 
 
Peters argues that historical institution, and more specifically the idea of path 
dependency, cannot explain change; a fairly common critique which we shall return to 
below. More importantly here, he contends that: ‘to uncover the explanations for the 
changes… we are forced to move outside the approach itself …There appears to be no 
such dynamic element in the theory itself, unless one accepts the dysfunctions of initial 
design as a sufficient cause’. Peters extends this critique suggesting that the methodology 
of historical  institutionalism is problematic because the position is  non-falsifiable; so, to 
Peters, it is unclear how much deviation form an inertial path is needed to argue that an 
historicist explanation was not effective in a particular case. Moreover, he suggests that 
historical institutionalism contains no basic premise form which prediction about 
behaviour can be made.  As such, Peters points to a functionalism (and structuralism) in 
historical institutionalism. In light of these considerations, Peters contends that historical 
institutionalism may be better conceived of as variant of March and Olsen’s normative 
institutionalism, because non-falsifiability prevents it being an empirical theory.  
 
Of course, these criticisms are problematic in two central respects. Firstly, they are 
premised upon a static understanding of historical institutionalism that few would 
advance; this is another point to which we return below when we stress the dialectical 
nature of the best historical institutionalist analysis. Secondly, Peters is invoking a 
positivist understanding of political science, as though it was incontestable and 
uncontested. In our view most of the best historical institutionalist work is not grounded 
in this epistemology.  
 
ii) Two Cheers for Hay and Wincott 
Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 957), as have others (see Lowndes, 2002) distinguish between 
three variants of new institutionalism: rational choice, sociological and historical.  They 
argue that, while any ‘crude synthesis’ between them is not ‘immediately practical or 
desirable (p.957)’, a dialogue between them is essential and possible.  This view, to an 
extent, also informs Pierson and Skocpol’s position.  
 
In contrast, Hay and Wincott (1998, p.951) argue that such a dialogue is difficult because 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism are rooted in mutually incompatible 
ontologies. To put it simply, rational choice institutionalism is based in a foundationalist 
ontological position and sociological institutionalism in an anti-foundationalist one (for 
an introduction to these arguments see Marsh and Furlong, 2002).  Hay and Wincott go 
further however and claim that historical institutionalism can and should develop a 
separate ontology; although they are a trifle coy about giving this alternative position a 
name.  In contrast, we have no such qualms advocating a critical realist alternative to 
positivism and interrpretivism. 
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Certainly, however we would endorse Hay and Wincott’s view that rational choice 
theory, which is most often foundationalist in ontological terms and positivist in 
epistemological terms, and sociological institutionalism, which is most often anti-
foundationalist in ontological terms and interpretivist in epistemological terms, cannot be 
integrated because their basic assumptions are so different.  Of course, that does not mean 
that work conducted from within one ontological and epistemological framework cannot 
be used within another, but that has to be done very carefully, with full acknowledgement 
of the ontological and epistemological issues. Ontological and epistemological positions 
are more akin to a skin, than a sweater; they cannot be put on and taken off at will. 
 
iii) Three Cheers for Critical Realism 
Both Pierson and Skocpol and Hall and Taylor avoid a discussion of their ontological and 
epistemological positions, perhaps because this would involve opening a confrontation 
with the rational choice theorists who dominate US Political Science.  In contrast, Hay 
and Wincott assert the need for historical institutionalism to develop an alternative 
ontology.   
 
To Hall and Taylor historical institutionalism is divided between calculus and cultural 
approaches and reconciling these two approaches offers a way forward. We agree with 
Hay and Wincott’s criticism of this position on a number of grounds.  First, as we argued 
earlier, in our view this is an inadequate characterisation of the historical institutionalist 
literature.  Second, as Hay and Wincott emphasise, calculus and cultural approaches are 
what characterise respectively, rational choice and sociological institutionalism; so, Hall 
and Taylor are trying to square a circle.  These positions reflect different ontologies and 
epistemologies which cannot simply be reconciled to produce a distinctive historical 
institutionalism. Third, and most important, critical realism does offer an alternative 
ontology and epistemology which can underpin a distinctive historical institutionalist 
approach to the structure/agency problem and the relationship between ideas and 
institutions which form the building blocks of any explanation of social stability and 
change. 
 
What is critical realism?  Cruickshank (2003, pp.1-2) argues that in ontological terms it is 
foundationalist:  
This view of knowledge holds that there is an objective reality, and instead 
of hoping one day we will somehow have absolute knowledge, the 
expectation is that knowledge claims will continue to be better 
interpretations of reality.  As knowledge claims are fallible, the best we 
can do is improve our interpretations of reality, rather than seek a 
definitive, finished ‘Truth’.  
 
As such, in epistemological terms the view is that our access to reality is mediated by 
theory, and theories are fallible.  Thus, as Cruickshank (2003, 2) continues: ‘research (is) 
from the very start influenced by assumptions.’  It is: ‘about gaining knowledge of a 
reality that exists independently of our representations of it’ (Cruickshank, 2003, p. 3). 
However, that knowledge is interpreted through the theoretical lens of the researcher. 
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Of course, much more could be said about critical realism and indeed there are many 
contentious issues among its supporters.  However, the key point here is that it is both a 
distinct position that takes issue with positivism and interpretivism and a position which 
fits happily with the basic concerns and contentions of historical institutionalism, as we 
will see below. 
 
b) Structure and Agency 
In claiming that ‘institutional analysis... allows us to examine the relationship between 
political actors as objects and as agents of history’, Thelan and Steinmo point to the 
centrality of issues of structure and agency to institutionalism in general. This concern is 
picked up by Peters who argues that historical institutionalism ia based upon the un-
interrogated assumption that individuals who choose to participate in an institution will 
simply accept the constraints that institutional membership impose. He also contends that 
scant attention is given to how individuals may have shaped institutions at the point of 
inception. Consequently, Peters concludes that historical intuitionalists are:  ‘not 
particularly concerned with how individuals relate to the institutions within which they 
function’. As such, Peters is rehearsing a common criticism of historical institutionalism, 
that it is structuralist.  
 
Two points need to made here. Firstly, Peters ignores the fact that, to an extent, new 
institutionalism developed as a response to more agency-centred behavioural and rational 
choice accounts, so it is unsurprising that some authors stress the extent to which 
structures constrain I\or faciliatate agents4. Secondly, Peters reading, rooted as it is in his 
positivism, fails to recognise that historical institutionalism can, and some historical 
institutionalists do, develop a more dynamic approach to the relationship between 
structure and agency. 
 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) offer a limited response to the structure/agency problem based on 
their division of historical institutionalism into calculus and cultural approaches. In their 
view, calculus approaches embrace the notion of strategic action and centre on the ways 
in which institutions: ‘affect individual action by altering the expectations an actors has 
about the actions are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action’. 
Cultural explanations stress that individuals are not just strategic but, rather, are bound by 
their own world view; institutions thus provide moral or cognitive templates for 
interpretation and action. However, this view is strongly contested by Hay and Wincott 
who claim that dividing historical institutionalise approaches along these lines is a 
‘considerable disservice’ to the approach. In contrast, Hay and Wincott contend that 
historical institutionalism has the potential to transcend sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism and develop a distinctive sociological ontology based on the strategic 
                                                 
4 Hay and Wincott (1998, p. 952), following Ward (1995) among others, argue that rational choice theory 
presents a structuralist position, because it: ‘strips away all distinctive features of individuality, replacing 
political subjects with calculating automatoms’.  To an extent this is right because, once preferences are 
assumed and the agent’s decision making scheme is specified, then agents are expected to act in a pre-
defined way.  Nevertheless, this is a different idea of structure than that adopted, for example, by Marxists, 
who see structures as ontologically separate from agents. 
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interaction of agents and institutions.  From this perspective, actors are strategic in 
seeking to realise contingent, and often changing, goals in a context which they context 
that they perceive as favouring some strategies over others. Hay and Wincott thus share 
Peters’ view that ideas have a key role explaining action. However, whereas Peters 
focuses on the capacity of institutions to sell ideas, Hay and Wincott see ideas as 
affecting action, first, by shaping agents’ perceptions of the context within which they 
operate and, second, because the dominance of certain discourses leads to a discursive 
selectivity, in which some strategies are favoured over others.  
 
The main point here is that an institutionalist position that privileges structure or agency 
is limited.  As such, we need an approach that sees the relationship between structure and 
agency as dialectical, that is interactive and iterative.  This is an approach which is 
axiomatic within critical realism.  Structures facilitate and constrain agents.  However, 
agents interpret structures, in large part as mediated by discourse.  In acting, agents can 
change the structure and that changed structure provides the new structure that constrains 
and facilitates agents, providing the context within which they act. 
 
Of course, all we have suggested is that the relationship between structure and agency is 
best seen as dialectical and that critical realism privileges such an approach.  We have 
said nothing in detail about how that dialectical relationship should be conceptualised or 
studies.  Indeed, that is beyond our concerns here. Suffice it to emphasise that there are at 
least three, more or less well-developed, dialectical approaches to the structure/agency 
problem: Giddens’ structuration theory;  Jessop’s strategic relational theory; and Archer’s 
morphogenisis theory.  Each could provide a important element of an historical 
institutionalist approach. 
 
c) Institutions and Ideas and the Material and the Ideational? 
Hall and Taylor contend that historical institutionalists are: ‘especially concerned to 
integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as 
ideas, can make to political outcomes’. Hay and Wincott similarly emphasise the: ‘crucial 
space granted to ideas within this formulation [historical institutionalism]’ (see also Blyth 
and Campbell).   However, the apparent agreement that ideas are important in historical 
institutionalism should not detract from two points of contention. Firstly, the perceived 
role of ideas varies between different ‘historical institutionalist’ accounts. So, Hall and 
Sikkink largely share a similar conceptualisation of ideas; Hall sees them as policy 
paradigms (templates guiding policy), while Sikkink focuses upon the ideas held by 
groups, and both argue that ideas should be understood as part of a broader discourse. 
Nevertheless differences remain even here; so, Sikkink espouses a more overtly 
phenomological position from a more individualistic perspective, in contrast to Hall’s 
paradigms. Secondly, the conceptualisation of the role of ideas in individual accounts is 
often flawed. As Campbell notes, ideas are often poorly conceptualised – whilst many 
analysts point to an analytic distinction between ideas and institutions, the meaning of 
ideas has varied considerably. Moreover, Campbell suggests authors rarely demonstrate 
that ideas exercise an influence that is clearly independent of material interests. As such 
Campbell, contends that historical institutionalism has a materialist basis, whereby the: 
‘material interests of political and economic actors motivated politics and that these 
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interests were institutionally determined.’ A similar point is made by Blyth who suggests 
that, whilst historical institutionalists may indicate that ideas redefine political 
boundaries, dominant set of ideas etc, the ideas are not adequately theorised. Moreover, 
he suggests that the ‘ontological priority (given) to institutions keeps insights as mere 
insights.  
 
Once again, we would suggest that the different conceptualisations of ideas and their role 
reflect different understandings of historical institutionalism. The concern with the role of 
ideas in historical institutionalism is relatively new and is largely absent from earlier 
formulations. Peters argues that advocates of a historical institution: ‘must be capable of 
explaining why ideas are institutional and are not at least in principle independent of 
institutions. Institutions may adopt and embody ideas, but it is not clear that they actually 
determine the nature of the institutions’. Again Peters’ position reflects a static 
understanding of historical institutionalism and a limited conceptualisation of 
institutionalist ontology.  In contrast, Campbell and Blyth’s attack on the materialist 
tendencies of historical institutionalism take us back to its structuralist origins. These 
critiques suggest that historical institutionalism affords ontological primacy either to 
institutions or to structures, but that isn’t true in the case of many authors, and it certainly 
isn’t inevitable.  
 
Hay and Wincott argue that historical institutionalism can potentially to offer a more 
adequate theorisation of the relationships between institutions and ideas and the material 
and the ideational.  They don’t develop this point, but for a critical realist the way 
forward is evident.  Once again, we need to conceptualise the relationship between both 
institutions and ideas and the material and the ideational as dialectical.  So, institutions 
provide a key context within which ideas develop and are shaped, however, ideas clearly 
change institutions.5  Similarly, while material factors underpin ideas and discourses, 
discourses affect behaviour that changes the material world.6  
 
d) Path Dependency and Change: 
 
Whilst, the centrality of path dependency and associated concern with contingency and 
unintended consequences to historical institutionalism is widely accepted (Hall and 
Taylor, Hay and Wincott, Peters etc.) the perceived implications of this vary 
considerably.  The contention here is that, although such approaches share nominally 
similar understandings of ‘path dependency’, they diverge in terms of the way in which 
this fits with a conception of change as this is circumscribed by fundamental differences 
in the levels at which such accounts operate.  
 
                                                 
5 Here, we would take strong issue with Blyth’s argument (2002) that institutions underpin stability and 
ideas drive change. 
6 Here, we agree with Hay’s view that discourses of globalisation have real affects (on policy and then the 
material world), but also contend that the material realities of globalisation affect the resonance of 
discourse of globalisation. 
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Peters contends that: ‘the entire analytical framework [of historical institutionalism] 
appears to be premised upon the enduring effects of institutional and policy choices made 
at the initiation of a structure’.  As such, he contends it is ill-equipped to deal with change 
Hall and Taylor’s treatment of change in historical institutionalism is circumscribed by 
their separation of calculus from cultural approaches. In their view, the cultural approach 
can accommodate change, because it both offers a means through which one can explore 
the way in which institutions structure the vision(s) of those contemplating reform, and 
recognises that a different institutional practice may be adopted in order to enhance social 
legitimacy.  In contrast, the calculus approach, because of the centrality it gives to quasi-
contractual processes, negates the scope for change. As such, only the cultural approach 
offers potential space to theorise change or develop a more thorough understanding of 
path dependency.  Here then, change can only be explained by an appeal to sociological 
institutionalism. 
 
Once again, a critical realist approach offer a way forward.  Here, path dependency is a 
tendency, not an inevitability.  In addition, stability and change would not be treated as it 
seems to us to be in most of the literature as a dualism; what one might call the last 
dualism. Structures and institutions may under stability, but so can ideas.  More 
specifically, they may underpin certain elements of a system that are stable, while others 
are changing.  At other times, ideas may drive change, but so can institutions.  The key 
point is that, in order to explain stability or change, we inevitably appeal to one of the 
other dualities – structure/agency, the material/ideational and institutions and ideas.  Yet, 
if each of these is conceptualised as a duality, involving a dialectical relationship, as we 
have suggested, then two points surely follow.  First, the relationship between stability 
and change must also be recognised as a dialectical one; and, second, the approach 
directly attempts to understand explain both stability and change. 
 
 
In Conclusion 
This paper has had three main aims.  First, we have argued that Pierson and Skocpol’s 
representation of historical institutionalism is problematic because it makes far too many 
concessions to rational choice theory and presents a bland account of the strengths of 
historical institutionalism.  Second, we presented an analysis of the historical 
institutionalist position to show that it is diverse, with people operating with quite 
different views as to the content, purpose and role of historical institutionalism.  In 
particular, we suggest that historical institutionalism needs to be clear about its 
ontological and epistemological position and its conceptualistion of the relationships 
between structure and agency, the material and the ideational and institutions and ideas.  
Finally, we argue that the best way forward is to adopt a critical realist epistemology, 
which recognises that the relationship between structure/agency etc, should not be see as 
a dualism, but rather as a duality, or as we put it a dialectical relationship, interactive and 
iterative.  Adopting this position would mean that historical institutionalism would 
become a more distinctive position and one which can help explain both stability and 
change. 
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